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In this article, we introduce the concept of model uncertainty. We re-
view the frequentist and Bayesian ideas underlying model selection,
which serve as an introduction to the rest of this special issue on ‘All
models are wrong...’, a workshop under the same name was held in
March 2011 in Groningen to critically examined the field of statistical
model selection methods over the past 40 years. We briefly intro-
duce the philosophical debate that is concerned with model selection.
We present the results of a questionnaire that was distributed under
the participants of the workshop, showing that the field has not yet
reached a comforting consensus and is still in full swing.
Keywords and Phrases: model selection, model uncertainty, Bayes-
ian, frequentist, foundations, confirmation theory, questionnaire.
1 Introduction
On Tuesday morning March 16, 1971, Hirotake Akaike sat in the metro in a Tokyo
suburb with an impending deadline for a paper. On that journey, the general idea
behind the future Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) suddenly dawned on him.
Four decades later, the model selection landscape has become much more complex,
involving themes such as sparsity, high-dimensionality, explanatory versus predictive
ability, among other issues. To reﬂect on the achievements over this period, the
authors organized exactly forty years later a workshop on ‘All models are wrong:
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Groningen. This special issue of Statistica Neerlandica brings together statisticians,
philosophers and quantitative scientists to address the complexity of model uncer-
tainty, cutting-edge strategies to deal with model uncertainty and common (or not
so common) pitfalls in model selection. All of the authors were contributors to the
workshop and they were asked to also pay attention to foundational issues.
A statistical model is typically deﬁned as a collection of probability measures on
some outcome space. It comes very naturally to a statistician that all, except perhaps
one, of these measures are ‘wrong’. Traditionally, selection of one of these models
was based on ﬁt, i.e. the distance from the data to the model. ‘Fit’ can be deﬁned in
many ways, such as via some loss function, such as least squares, or maximum like-
lihood. Initially, it were semantic requirements of interpretation, that drove early
statisticians such as Karl Pearson and Ronald A. Fisher to discard ‘best ﬁtting’
models for simpler, but less well-ﬁtting models. Hypothesis testing was essentially
introduced as a tool to trade-off ﬁt for simplicity.
Within regression modelling, probability measures are indexed by regression para-
meters. Regression semantics often involves answering questions such as whether a
variable should be included in the model. This, following Fisher’s lead, became the
subject of hypothesis testing in the ﬁfties and sixties. There was also criticism. Freed-
man’s paradox (Freedman, 1983) showed how repeated selection of variables by
testing distorts nominal signiﬁcance levels and gives no guarantee against including
unrelated variables. In fact, the rather unspeciﬁc question ‘what is the best model?’
turned out to have more than one meaning: (i) which modelling procedure will, with
sufﬁcient data, identify the true model?, or (ii) based on the data, which model lies
closest to the true model? Despite the apparent similarities between these questions,
they turned out to be quite different and surprisingly incompatible.
2 AIC and BIC: between proximity and truth
In this section, we will deal with the methodological and technical aspects of model
uncertainty. First, we focus on frequentist methodologies, which are based on ﬁnd-
ing models close to the truth and involve either implicitly or explicitly some consid-
eration of model complexity. Then we consider orthodox Bayesian methods aimed
at obtaining the posterior distribution on the model space. This means that they
implicitly presuppose that the integral of all model posterior probabilities equals
one, i.e. that the Bayesian believes that one of the models under consideration is
the true model.
2.1 Akaike’s information criterion
Akaike’s information criterion did not completely fall out of the sky. In the 1960s,
many applied statistician grabbled with variable selection as one of the primary prob-
lems within statistical modelling. In 1964 and 1966, C.L. Mallows gave two talks
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at IMS and ASA meetings on a visual aid for variable selection. Mallows (1973)
presented the method formally as a way to minimize the expected prediction error,
which was also the point of departure of Akaike. Interestingly, Mallows (1973)
warns against using ‘his’ Cp method as a model selection tool, instead of a method
for selecting a set of models with good predictive performance.
Akaike’s contribution was to look beyond the regression model and to make the
method available in a general likelihood setting. In the usual setting of n independent
observations, we can deﬁne a statistical model Mi ={P | ∈i} as a collection of
measures on the data Y ∈Sn for some outcome space S, indexed by a pi-dimensional
parameter space i . When we consider several competing models, we are, in fact,
considering competing collections of measures on the data. Let’s consider a ﬁnite
number k of such collections, i.e., M={M1, . . .,Mk}, each indexed by their own
ﬁnite dimensional parameter space .
Akaike proposed to minimize a quantity, called the AIC, across M, where the
AIC is deﬁned as
AIC(Mi)=−2 logPˆi (Y )+2pi , (1)
where pi =dim(i). The idea of the AIC is to select the best approximating model
to the unknown true data generating process, in the sense of the Kullback–Leibler
(KL) divergence. As we do not know the measure that corresponds to the true data
generating process, we have to estimate this divergence. In the derivation of the
AIC, i.e. the estimation of the KL divergence, one uses several asymptotic identities.
Especially for small samples, these approximations can be too liberal, in the sense
of favouring larger models. Instead, small sample results have been derived in sev-
eral special cases. For example, for the normal linear regression model the so-called
corrected AIC, or AICc, is given as
AICc(Mi)=−2 logPˆi (Y )+
2pi
n/(n−pi −1) ,
where the term n/(n−pi −1) is a ﬁrst order bias correction in the estimation of the
KL divergence, that goes to 1 when the number of observations goes to inﬁnity. This
correction seems to ‘work’ quite well also in other circumstances.
2.1.1 Derivation of the AIC
Suppose the data Y is generated from the true density g. Let Mi be our parametric
model with parameter space i , a compact subset of Rpi . Let ˆi be the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE), then ˆ minimizes the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence
between the ﬁtted and the true model
KL()=
∫
g(y) log g(y) dy−
∫
g(y) log f (y;) dy,
where f (·;) is the density associated with P. If we were lucky to select f (·;)=g,
then the divergence would be zero. Simply selecting the model Mi that minimizes the
© 2012 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2012 VVS.
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KL divergence, however, is not an option as bigger models have a non-decreasing
divergence compared to nested alternatives. Minimizing Eg(KL(ˆi)) across i does not
suffer from this problem, as, roughly, the MLE ˆ and the average KL divergence are
calculated on different datasets. The problem is that this quantity is unobservable
and needs to be estimated. First of all C =∫ g(y) log g(y) dy is unobservable, but this
can be ignored, because it is constant across all i . This leaves us with estimating,
li =Eg
∫
g(y) log f (y; ˆi) dy,
where the expectation is over the data used for estimating ˆi . The natural estimator
lˆ i = log f (yo; ˆi(yo)),
where yo is the observed data, typically overshoots its target li by a quantity given
as




















These pi ×pi matrices are identical if g≡ f (·, ˆi), in which case p*i =pi . One could try
to estimate the matrices Ji and Ki , as is done for example in the Takeuchi Informa-
tion Criterion (TIC) by replacing Ji and Ki by their empirical counterparts. How-
ever, this can be very unstable. Typically, it is better to use pi directly, which leads
to the following estimator of the KL divergence,
K̂Li =C − lˆ i +pi ,
where C =∫ g(y) log g(y) dy is an irrelevant constant that does not depend on i.
Taking out C and multiplying the above equation by 2 gives us the AIC as deﬁned
in Equation (1).
2.1.2 Van der Linde’s model complexity
Interestingly, in the derivation of the AIC, a notion of model complexity appears
as a relevant term in determining the best model. Apparently, if one ‘penalizes’ the
likelihood by some model complexity term, one obtains a measure of how close a
statistical model approaches the true data generating measure. This opened up a
important line of research in ideas about model complexity, or model degrees of
freedom. Important developments in general covariance penalty theory (Friedman,
Hastie and Tibshirani, 2001; Efron, 2004) showed that the degrees of freedom can
© 2012 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2012 VVS.





cov(Yi , ˆi(Y )),
where  is the natural parameter associated with the loss function. For the squared
loss function, this is the mean parameter and in the case of ordinary multiple linear
regression modelling, this results in gdf =Tr(X (XtX )−1Xt)=p, where p is the rank
of the matrix X.
Model complexity is, however, itself a complex issue, for which various points
of view exist. Angelika van der Linde explains in ‘A Bayesian view of model com-
plexity’ in this volume that there are a variety of deﬁnitions for model complexity.
Roughly speaking, she identiﬁes two forms of model selection targets: average and
representative targets. Average targets correspond to using mutual information as
measure of model complexity, which occurs naturally in Bayesian modelling. Rep-
resentative targets of model complexity correspond to using the KL-divergence with
a representative density, as is done in the AIC. In her article, she gives an exten-
sive review of various measures of model complexity. In the end, she favours the
information theoretic ideas of model complexity, especially in an new era of sta-
tistics, where neural networks, mixtures, reduced rank regression, hidden Markov
models etc. do not satisfy the commonly assumed regularity conditions (like positive
deﬁniteness of the Fisher information matrix) underlying the AIC and BIC.
2.1.3 Claeskens’ FIC
As several authors have pointed out already, a model selection algorithm cannot
be optimal both for prediction accuracy and for variable selection consistency. A
universal ‘best’ model selection criterion is therefore impossible. Claeskens argues
in her article that this implies that one has to choose a model selection focus. She
deﬁnes a focussed model selection criterion (FIC) that aims to minimize the mean
squared error of a particular parameter estimate, such as the mean, the variance, or
particular covariate parameters.
Despite formulating the information criterion as aminimizationproblemof themean
squared error, there is some connection with the AIC. It can be shown that if the focus
is a single parameter, then the FIC and the AIC are identical (Claeskens and Hjort,
2008). This is a rare case, but it does show that the FIC, just like the AIC, is more
interested in prediction accuracy, rather than variable selection consistency. In fact, in
her contribution, ‘Focused estimation andmodel averagingwith penalizationmethods,
an overview’, Claeskens applies the FIC to a non-sparse approximation to the lasso.
The lasso (Tibshirani, 1996) is a penalized regressionmethod that automatically select
variable depending on the penalty parameter. Claeskens argues that ‘the decision to set
variables to zero (hence to not select them for inclusion in themodel) should come from
the value of the FIC (which combines the loss function of choice with the speciﬁc
focus to estimate)’ and not ‘be determined by the penalty itself, without taking the
© 2012 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2012 VVS.
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focus and loss into account.’ This is a philosophy of science that is inspired by the
use of models in the social sciences, psychology and economics. Empirical models
are tools to achieve some end, which, in the light of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos,
is rarely ‘truth itself ’. Variable selection consistency is a concept entirely foreign to
such pragmatic model builders. They are happy to ignore variables if it is useful, but
for no moment do they actually believe that the variables have no inﬂuence at all.
As statistician Gelman (2011) argues:
in the sort of social science problems I study, there are no true zeroes except by design
or through a natural experiment, and I do not see the point of statistical methods that
attempt to discover from data conditional independence patterns that cannot exist... I
follow Popper in believing that a model can be rejected, never accepted. I will go even
further and say that, realistically all my models are wrong.
2.2 Bayesian model uncertainty
Contrary to the frequentist position, the orthodox Bayesian framework is interested
in nothing less than the truth itself. Bayesians are not naive and famously allow for
uncertainty in their opinion about the truth. This uncertainty can stretch very far: a
Bayesian may not only be uncertain about the parameter values, but even about the
models themselves. In fact, this is how Bayesians view model uncertainty: as deter-
mining the posterior distribution p(y |M) on the model space M={M1, . . .,Mk}.
Hastie and Green argue that the quantities p(M|y) are the appropriate probabilities




p(y+ | M) p(M | y),





F () p( | M) ∂p(M | y),
for some function F of the parameters with ‘constant’ interpretation across the var-
ious models in M.
2.2.1 Friel and Wyse’s evidence
Given a class of models M, each one with its own parameter space M, where
M ∈ M, the ﬁrst task of a Bayesian is to ascertain the prior distribution on
M∪⋃M∈MM. After seeing the data, the Bayesian will update her prior and in
principle would be able to hand over the marginal posterior distribution on M.
As a distribution, it would reﬂect her true model uncertainty. She could also use this
posterior to perform some ‘unbayesian’ activities: she could consider the model M
that maximizes her posterior, or compare two model via a so-called Bayes’
factor, p(M1 | y)/p(M2 | y).
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The posterior model density involves the usual prior and likelihood contributions
and can be written as







p(y | M, ) p( | M)∂ (3)
The quantity p(y | M)=∫M p(y | M, ) p( | M)∂ is what is described in the
Friel and Wyse contribution as the marginal likelihood , integrated likelihood or sim-
ply as the evidence. Especially the last name is suggestive, since it is the only element
in Equation (2) that allow the data to favour one or another model, since p(y) is
constant and p(M) is the prior, chosen irrespective of the data.
Friel and Wyse dedicate their article in explaining the various ways that the evi-
dence can be calculated in practice. This is a non-trivial task as the integration in
Equation (3) for moderately complex models can be across a large sample space
M.
2.2.2 Bayesian information criterion
The simplest method for calculating the integral is based on the Laplace approxima-
tion and was proposed in Schwarz (1978). The Laplace approximation states that




2C | f ′′(x0) | eCf (x0).
If we take a ﬂat prior on M, the evidence can be approximated for M∈M as


















where l¯() = l()/n is the mean log-likelihood for model M and p the dimension-
ality of the parameter space M. Schwarz (1978) proposed to ignore, for large n,
the terms that do not depend on n, resulting in
p(y | M)≈ el(ˆ)n−p/2, for large n.
If, furthermore, one is willing to put a ﬂat prior on M, then the posterior model
probability for large n can be written as
p(M | y)≈ cel(ˆ)n−p/2/p(y), for large n.
© 2012 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2012 VVS.
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By applying an arbitrarily monotone decreasing transformation to the above and
ignoring the constant terms c and p(y), we get
BIC(M)=−2l(ˆ)+p log(n),
which is named the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Minimizing the BIC
corresponds to maximizing the posterior model probability for a large number of
observations and can be thought of as a way of selecting a model. For a Bayesian,
however, it would be more appropriate to consider the model weights W (M),
W (M)= e−BIC(M)/2,
which in their rescaled form exactly correspond to the posterior model probabilities
themselves,
p(M0 |y)= W (M0)∑
M∈MW (M)
.
2.2.3 Hastie and Green’s reversible jump MCMC
In their article, Hastie and Green aim to obtain the posterior model probability
p(M | y) in another way. They use the idea that it is possible to sample from any
distribution p, if this distribution is the stationary distribution associated with some
Markov Chain. Green (1995) has shown that this is possible in a fundamental way
even for model probabilities by ingeniously constructing a transdimensional Markov
Chain. By Monte Carlo sampling from this Markov chain, the relative frequencies of
visiting each model M∈M converges to the posterior model probability p(M | y).
Despite this attractively simple sounding summary, the devil is deﬁnitely in the de-
tails. Most of the Hastie and Green contribution is about implementational issues
regarding the Markov chain. The usual Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC)
issues, such as sensible priors, effective move proposals, sufﬁcient mixing and con-
vergence, are at least twice as difﬁcult in a so-called reversible jump MCMC, used
for walking around the model space.
3 Model selection as a philosophical topic
As introduced in the foregoing, statistical model selection is ﬁrst and foremost a
topic within mathematical statistics. But foundational questions are never far off. If
all models are wrong, in the sense that models never tell the whole truth but at best
represent fragments of it, then what motivates our focus on particular fragments?
How does this relate to the multitude of measures for comparing models? And why
rely on simple models rather than complex ones? The past twenty years or so have
seen a lively philosophical debate over such questions, and to most statisticians these
questions will sound familiar too. In what follows we provide a quick introduction
© 2012 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2012 VVS.
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to the foundational side of model selection, and we brieﬂy comment on foundational
aspects of the papers in this special issue.
3.1 Philosophical perspectives on model selection
When characerised in sufﬁcient generality, it becomes apparent that statistical model
selection answers a traditional philosophical question. Model selection concerns the
choice of a model, a theoretical framework that accommodates and predicts empir-
ical data. A model selection tool ﬁxes the criteria for choosing among models, and
thereby speciﬁes what aspects of accommodation and prediction are valued, and to
what degree. Model selection theory can therefore be considered part of conﬁrmation
theory, a discipline within the philosophy of science that is concerned with norms
for the relation between theory and data.
Much of traditional conﬁrmation theory has focussed on an even more basic sta-
tistical topic, namely the evaluation of hypotheses against the background of a
statistical model (Romeijn and van de Schoot, 2008; Romeijn, 2011). Inductive
logic (Woods and Hartmann, 2011) formal learning theory (Kelly, 1996) so-called
Bayesian conﬁrmation theory (Earman, 1992), and other perspectives involved in
the debate over paradoxes of conﬁrmation (e.g. Eells and Fitelson, 2000; Fitel-
son, 2006) provide accounts of the support that data lend to a hypothesis within a
given probabilistic setting. The topic of model selection is markedly different. It is
not so much aimed at the evaluation of a particular hypothesis in a given setting, but
rather at the evaluation of the setting itself. Whereas, for example, Carnap’s induc-
tive logic (Carnap, 1952) evaluates predictions on the assumption that particular
patterns in the data are salient, model selection is aimed at evaluating the focus on
particular patterns in comparison to other patterns in the data.
In short, model selection concerns not so much statistical procedures and infer-
ences, but rather their assumptions and starting points. Consequently, foundational
questions about model selection cannot be answered solely by paying close atten-
tion to mathematical details in the procedures and inferences involved. They require
us to confront fundamental issues in statistics, and to look at the wider context in
which model selection is used. Perhaps the most central issue here is the so-called
reference class problem (Hájek, 2007). The probability of an event is associated
with a population of which the event is a subset. The reference class problem states
that many such populations typically do exist. If Anna is a smoking vegetarian who
studied maths and does Yoga, then what population should we choose to determine
the probability that she will eventually develop Alzheimer’s disease? Or, to put the
question in model selection form, what variables should we include in the statisti-
cal model that will be used to predict Anna’s old age? In the face of this context
sensitivity, our intuition that there is such a probability seems very hard to uphold.
One way of looking at model selection is that it is aimed at resolving the prob-
lem of the reference class. There are again different ways of looking at the solution
that model selection provides. One prominent way emphasizes the pragmatic aspects,
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taking model selection as a trade-off between the goals of accommodating old data
and predicting new (Forster and Sober, 1994; Hitchcock and Sober, 2004) or,
equivalently, of balancing bias and variance, or, again equivalently, of weighing
complexity against ﬁt. On the one hand, we want to avoid including too many vari-
ables in the model, because the estimation of the parameters in the model will in
that case become very variable. In other words, we want to avoid accommodating
the historical data too much and thereby getting unreliable predictions on future
data. On the other hand, we also want to avoid including too few variables in the
model, because in that case prediction will be heavily biased. That is, we want to
avoid accommodating the data too little and thereby making our predictions inaccu-
rate. But there are other ways of looking at model selection. We might for instance
maintain that model selection tools are an instrument for getting at the true distri-
bution, and that their pragmatic value is a mere consequence of their ability to hone
in on the truth.
However one looks at model selection, one theme is always prominent and contin-
ues to capture the interest of philosophers of science: simplicity. Especially appealing
is the idea that model selection tools provide an independently motivated
formalization of simplicity (Forster, 2000; Kelly, 2007), a concept that has been
present in philosophical discussions ever since Ockham’s Numquam ponenda est plu-
ralitas sine necessitate1 but that seems to have eschewed analytic treatment until only
a few decades ago. There are good reasons to evaluate this idea critically. First,
while simplicity as dimensionality indeed follows from independently motivated epi-
stemic goals, like proximity to the truth (AIC) or probability of truth (BIC), other
approaches such as the Minimum Description Length principle (Rissanen, 1983;
Grünwald, Myung and Pitt, 2005) assume a concept of simplicity at the outset.
Second, there are several aspects of models that are intuitively associated with their
simplicity but that do not register in traditional model selection tools (Romeijn,
2012). Third, and most obviously, there are many examples of the role of simplicity
in science that cannot be ﬁtted into the mold of statistical model selection.
Nevertheless, it does seem that statistical model selection presents ample oppor-
tunity for exploring and structuring the concept of simplicity (Dowe, Gardner and
Oppy, 2007). And more generally, it seems that the potentials of model selection as
an integral part of conﬁrmation theory are far from exhausted (Henderson et al.,
2010). Again closer to the foundations of statistics there are many aspects of model
selection presently left unexplored (Chakrabarti and Ghosh, 2011). For all these
reasons, we expect the foundations of model selection to be a lively ﬁeld of inquiry
for decades to come.
3.2 Philosophical perspectives in this special issue
The papers of Longford and van der Linde both make general points on the theory
of model selection. Claeskens considers particular model selection tools, while Green
and Friel are both concerned with the computation and computational tractability
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of model selection problems. Finally, Wenmackers confronts statistical model selec-
tion as it appears in the social sciences with the choice of models in experimental
physical science. The ﬁrst two and the last of these will be given special attention
because they are most naturally related to the themes raised in the foregoing.
3.2.1 Theoretical views
Longford’s paper brings to the fore an aspect to model selection that has received
only cursory attention up till now. Model selection tools are used to decide between
models. Longford’s argues that the decision to use one model to the exclusion of
others need not be the result of model selection. Instead, Longford proposes to use
the so-called composition of estimators, essentially replacing the estimator of the
best model by a weighted linear combination of the estimators from all models,
using the quality of the estimators, typically expressed by the mean squared error,
as weights. One might say that this proposal is the frequentist equivalent of Bayesian
model averaging. The approach of Longford further highlights that model selection
is intimately connected to decision problems and that it need not lead to the deci-
sion to use a single model. In this sense his paper is also related to foundational
work in statistics that emphasizes the necessity of a decision–theoretic component
in any theory of statistics (Savage, 1951; Seidenfeld, 1979).
Van der Linde’s paper addresses a question that is directly related to the fore-
going discussion on the trade-off between variance and bias. Van der Linde ob-
serves that within Bayesian approaches to model selection, we ﬁnd many different
expressions for the complexity, or the effective number of parameters, of a model.
This observation motivates the introduction of an abstract notion of complexity
that may unify these different expressions. The abstract notion, to which van der
Linde appeals, stems from information theory: the mutual information of data and
model parameters. The joint density over data and parameters that serves as in-
put to the mutual information comes in two versions, namely prior and posterior,
depending on whether the data are those already obtained and the distribution over
parameters is the prior, or else the data are those over which the model expresses
expectations and the distribution over parameters is the posterior. Moreover, by
replacing the Bayesian model averages by the best-ﬁtting distributions from the mod-
els, frequentist approaches can be considered in the same information–theoretic per-
spective. An especially appealing aspect of this perspective on model complexity is
that it emerges from taking the marginal entropy of the distribution over data as an
expression of model performance. The marginal entropy naturally decomposes into a
goodness-of-ﬁt term and a mutual information term, suggesting that the informa-
tion–theoretic perspective motivates a speciﬁc balance between bias and variance.
This latter point calls for some further philosophical reﬂection. Van der Linde
does not claim there is a one-size-ﬁts-all answer to the question of how to trade bias
against variance. She shows herself sensibly sensitive to the fact that no such answers
exist and that statistical procedures are essentially context-dependent. Nonetheless,
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information theory seems to provide a framework for unifying different expressions
of model complexity, both for frequentists and Bayesians and both for prior and
posterior versions of model performance. We may expect that the question of how
to balance bias and variance is properly structured by this framework, so that every-
one can at least agree on what considerations determine the balance. A question that
is open for exploration is how this relates to philosophical views on this trade-off. In
particular, it may be argued that the existence of this common framework points to
the trade-off being not purely pragmatic, but, at least partially, a matter of principle.
3.2.2 Applications and computation
In contrast to the unifying perspective of van der Linde, the paper by Claeskens
illustrates the wide variety of applications of model selection, thereby suggesting
its ultimately pragmatic character. Claeskens’ paper deals with model selection un-
der a further speciﬁcation of the aims of the model, namely of getting a particular
estimate right. As Claeskens shows, the speciﬁcation of such a focus for the model
selection procedure may be favourably employed when dealing with, in this case,
high-dimensional data.
The papers by Hastie and Green and Friel and Wyse are both concerned with
computational aspects of Bayesian model selection. Despite present appearances to
the contrary, philosophical perspectives are certainly not insensitive to computa-
tional worries, as witnessed by the interest in network representations and local
computation (Haenni et al., 2010) and the growing literature on the epistemic sta-
tus of simulations (Morgan, 2005; Frigg and Reiss, 2009). For the purpose of this
introduction, however, including these philosophical perspectives will lead us too far
aﬁeld.
3.2.3 Broader reﬂection
Wenmackers and Vanpoucke discuss the phenomenon of a scientiﬁc model in the
context of material science, involving both empirical and strictly theoretical struc-
tures in their account. They analyze the evaluation of these models in experimen-
tal physics. Their discussion provides some valuable observations and reminders for
both philosophers and practitioners of model selection. One of their observations
is simply that scientiﬁc models are always abstract and idealized versions of the
target system, thereby defusing the claim that all models are wrong. The key is not
to be too wrong. A second observation is that considerations that lead to the pre-
ferred level of abstraction are mostly pragmatic in nature, once again highlighting
the context dependence of balancing bias and variance. A third observation pertains
to scientiﬁc realism and stands in stark contrast to the second one. Moreover, it con-
nects in interesting ways to the topics discussed in the ﬁrst subsection. Following the
theoretical viewpoint of most material scientists, we might portray statistical model
selection as getting at the true chances of events. Accordingly, we might motivate
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the trade-off between bias and variance by its truth-conduciveness rather than by
their pragmatic value. Of course, such a perspective hinges on there being a sensible
way of spelling out the notion of true chance.
Perhaps most prominently, the paper by Wenmackers and Vanpoucke reminds us
of the fact that the internal variance of the statistical model does not capture all
of our uncertainty on how the model relates to the world out there. Following the
detailed description of the experimental procedures, it becomes apparent that at least
some of our uncertainty remains hidden from view, because it is caused by uncer-
tainty over assumptions that were made to obtain clean data sets. The very same
thing can of course be said about statistics. It is a challenging suggestion, especially
in a statistics journal, that quantitative error bars may well lead to a false sense of
security. However comprehensive the model, some uncertainties will not be captured
in probabilistic terms and hence must be expressed qualitatively.
4 Questionnaire
During the organization of the workshop, the idea of a questionnaire arose to ﬁnd
out whether professionals interested in model selection share a general consensus
on this topic or whether they have substantial different views. Traditionally, model
selection was performed on the basis of hypothesis testing in combination with for-
ward, backward or stepwise approaches. With the introduction of Akaike’s infor-
mation criteria, hypothesis testing as a model selection tool has been shown to be
problematic, but it has not been eliminated from the traditional toolbox of the sci-
entist. In the ﬁeld of model selection many different information criteria have been
developed to improve upon the work of Akaike, and also Bayesian approaches like
model averaging was introduced in section 2. Thus besides a traditional controversy
in model selection on hypothesis testing another form of controversy between frequ-
entists and Bayesians has entered this domain of research.
Eleven multiple choice questions were constructed to obtain the opinions and
views of the community on model selection. All participants, including speakers,
registered for the workshop were sent the questionnaire by email and were asked to
explain their answers as much as possible to each question. Three questions (1, 4,
and 9) asked about personal favorites, three questions (2, 6, and 10) were more of a
general nature, two questions (5 and 7) asked about the purpose of some techniques,
and ﬁnally three questions (3, 8, and 11) were more of a technical nature, see Appen-
dix A. Question twelve gave the participants the opportunity to formulate their own
questions and answers. In total 110 participants received the questionnaire, but only
16 persons returned their answers to us and even within this group not all questions
were answered by everyone or explained in much detail. Some characteristics of the
responders are given in Table 1.
Although it is a small group of respondents, the diversity in characteristics is rel-
ative large. Indeed, they include invited and contributed speakers, poster presenters,
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Table 1. Characteristics of the participants that ﬁlled in the questionnaire
Type of Answering Workshop changed
participant (n) Age (n) Gender (n) questionnaire (n) my mind (n)
Invited speaker (3) ≤30 (3) Male (8) Before workshop (7) Yes (6)
Contributed speaker (5) (30, 60] (9) Female (6) After workshop (8) No (4)
Poster presentation (2) >60 (3) More subtle (0) NA (1) NA (6)
Attendee (5) NA (1) NA (2)
and attendees. Furthermore, all ages were represented as well as both sexes. About
50% of the respondents answered the questionnaire before the workshop and one
fourth changed their mind on model selection concepts endorsed by the workshop.
The answers to the questions of these respondents are listed in Appendix A by a
frequency behind the answers.
4.1 Personal favorites
Based on the personal choices of the respondents to questions 1, 4 and 9, the group
of respondents seems quite heterogeneous. Indeed, the respondents see themselves as
different types of persons and they prefer a wide variety of measures for model com-
parison. Some respondents strongly discard model averaging on the basis of having
no justiﬁcation of model weights and they believe that model averaging may not be
applicable in each context. One remark was that model averaging is prohibited by
the publish-or-perish culture in science. Most respondents felt that the choice be-
tween model averaging and selection depends on the research question and they did
not classify themselves to just one of the two groups. Some respondents mentioned
that a mechanical approach towards selection and averaging should be avoided, be-
cause the ‘best’ model may not be the right choice in some circumstances. The model
averaging persons selected their option since they believe in posterior model prob-
abilities or are true Bayesians. Some selected alternative measures for model com-
parison; the mean squared error and false negatives. The Kullback–Leibner distance
was defended by the fact that it relates to likelihood, which may be considered the
key measure for parametric inference. Some respondents made a particular choice
for themselves, but argued that they felt comfortable with some of the other mea-
sures as well, like the Kullback–Leibner distance. An important remark towards the
choice of measures is to check if the selected model actually models something that
makes sense. This means that the model should have a relevant meaning to the sub-
stantive science.
4.2 General questions
The three questions 2, 6, and 10 asked about opinions on general topics or con-
cepts, like the general consensus on minimizing model complexity, or the statement
of George Box that all models are wrong or why we should pursue model selection
in the ﬁrst place if we do not believe in true models. The respondents were more
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uniform in this area. They believed that a true model does not exist or is not attain-
able with ﬁnite data, at least when the meaning of ‘wrong’ is interpreted as that it is
not the same as reality. The reasons are that truth is considered a static notion, while
reality is more dynamic. The space of models is also considered very thin within the
space of reality and models are considered only simpliﬁcation of reality. An inter-
esting remark was that a model that would be 100% consistent with reality would
not be a model. There was one exception that felt that not all models are wrong
since randomized experiments can go quite far in terms of giving causal interpreta-
tions, meaning that the ‘truth’ is almost attained. Furthermore, some respondents
felt that models are formulated for a particular purpose and can therefore never
be considered wrong; they can only be applied incorrectly. For instance, a hammer
is not wrong, not even when you might need a screwdriver. Most of the respon-
dents repeated what George Box added to his phrase, that some models are useful.
Some claimed that it is better than nothing, since there is no alternative, but oth-
ers were convinced that models are essential. A true model is not needed; the only
thing that matters is a correct answer to the question. Even stronger, model selec-
tion is of importance especially when there is not a true model. Selection will help
us ﬁnd the best guess as good as possible. In case of a true model we would ﬁnd
it eventually. One respondent felt that model selection or model averaging makes
sense only in textbook exercises, because when there is more at stake models are
problematic. The question on model complexity was considered irrelevant by some
respondents, since the measure of interest should completely determine the model
selection, everything else would not lead to recognizable principles. Others felt that
it would depend on the situation. If a simpler model would not include a relevant
variable, then the simpler model would not be preferred. In this context, the mea-
sures of model comparison and complexity are only guides and not laws. On the
other hand, simpler models have a higher chance of being applied and are easier to
understand, which argues for simpler models. Some respondents viewed model com-
plexity more practically. If a simpler model were to be more robust in prediction,
simplicity would be preferred.
4.3 Purpose of model selection/averaging
The use of model averaging in relation to prediction and parameter estimation (ques-
tion 5) was not clear to most respondents, since half of the respondents answered
with ‘don’t know’. One respondent felt that models should not be averaged at all,
but parameters should be averaged instead. Furthermore, comparing parameter esti-
mates from different models should be avoided due to lack of independence. One
respondent pointed towards the econometrics literature (without speciﬁc citations)
that suggests that model averaging is good for predictions, but bad for parameter
estimates. However, another respondent argues that for linear models model aver-
aging would be beneﬁcial both for predictions and parameter estimates, but this is
less clear for non-linear models. The statement that ‘AIC leads to the most predictive
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model, whereas BIC leads to the true model’ gave some controversy. One respon-
dent argued that the question is completely irrelevant since most predictive is not
well-deﬁned and ﬁnding a model with the highest probability is a misguided goal.
Others argued that the AIC and BIC do not take into account substantive relevance
and could not agree to the statement. Of course, the respondents that do not believe
in the existence of a true model could only agree to the ﬁrst part, and some did on
the basis of the deﬁnition of AIC.
4.4 Technical issues
An increased sample size is generally considered as a bonus, since it will generate
more information, but there is some form of saturation since reality is not static
and collecting data takes time. Thus while adding data, the true model may have
moved on already. Reality may not be ergodic. Therefore, some respondents objected
to this question since they do not accept the notion of a true model. The respon-
dents seem to agree that whether including a variable known to be of relevance,
although the data may not suggest this, depends on the situation. In some cases
it is considered not necessary to include the variable since a simple misspeciﬁed
model can do better in inference than a more relevant model, in particular if the
model without the variable gives acceptable results. For random effects it can have
other consequences though, since random effects are more sensitive to selection bias
(e.g. in meta-analysis). On the other hand, some believe that adding just one such
‘known to have effects’ variable might not be too bad, but if many of these vari-
ables exist, the risk of over-ﬁtting is present. A true Bayesian would of course in-
clude the variable, since all prior information should be included. Objective proba-
bilities for model selection were considered unrealistic and cosmetic, and one respon-
dent felt that this last part should be the exclusive domain of beauticians, hairdress-
ers, etc. On the other hand, probabilities were considered epistemic, which does not
mean that they are illusory. Model probabilities were considered useful guidelines,
though perhaps not as laws. Furthermore, it was also believed that model selec-
tion can be based on expert judgment and generalizations of the modelled pro-
cesses.
4.5 Open questions
The remarks from the respondents on the open question were quite diverse. Some
liked the idea of the questionnaire and were interested in the results, while others
felt that it has no use whatsoever. A speciﬁc question that came up was a question
about the meaning of P(Mi | y). The answer should be that it deﬁnes the prob-
ability that model i is the best model to use for data based inference. It should
not mean that it is the true or the actual model. Another question was whether
model complexity is important in determining a good model. This did not receive a
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conclusive answer. Somewhat related to this as well as to question 8, is a question
about whether statistics should work in isolation from existing theories? In particu-
lar, how can the information criteria take advantage of existing theories? The answer
was not provided, but the information criteria can easily be applied also to models
that were selected on the basis of other theories.
5. Conclusions
In this article we have introduced the general frequentist and Bayesian ideas behind
model uncertainty. The ﬁrst is based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence, whereas
the second is considering the posterior model probability. However, we have seen
that in practice, the difference between frequentist and Bayesian model selection
methods is probably smaller than antagonists on either side would like one to
believe.
Some developments have not been discussed in this article. Boosting and bagging
have entered the statistical vocabulary as ways to synthesize information using var-
ious models simultaneously. In the AIC and BIC literature these methods had their
origin as Akaike weights or Bayesian posterior model probabilities, which can be
used for subsequent inference. Again, similarities rather than differences are key,
although the Bayesian paradigm is more naturally suited for doing post-hoc infer-
ence using these posterior probabilities.
Studying the answers of the workshop participants to the questionnaire
demonstrated that the expected controversy in the ﬁeld of model selection and model
averaging is not resolved. For instance, there seems no uniformity in the choice on
measures for model comparison, nor is there agreement on the use of the measures
or the purpose of model averaging. True Bayesians answered the questions differ-
ently from those who do categorize themselves as frequentists. Some felt that model
selection and averaging is textbook material and not for the real world. This contro-
versy does not help in promoting the methods in real life settings. On the other hand,
most respondents did feel that model selection and averaging is relevant for the quest
of knowledge and believe that it contribute to science. As one of the respondents
wrote ‘disagreement is a scientiﬁc principle of the highest order’.
Appendix A
This section contains the questionnaire that was sent out to all the participants and
speakers of the workshop. In brackets it shows the number of people that selected
that answer.
1. Why are you interested or think you have to be interested in model selection?
(a) It’s all pervasive (5)
(b) It relates to what I am working on (8)
(c) Other... (3)
(d) I don’t know (0)
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2. The title of the workshop is “All models are wrong ...”. What is your own idea about this
statement?
(a) Yes, all models are wrong (10)
(b) No, not all models are wrong (1)
(c) It is a bit more subtle (4)
(d) I don’t know (1)
3. How does sample size affects concepts such as “best model”, “valid model”, “useful model”,
and/or “reliable model”. Is sample size fundamental in the discussion about whether models
are always wrong?
(a) With enough data the true model could be found (0)
(b) Even with an inﬁnite amount of data, the true model would prove evasive (11)
(c) I don’t know (2)
4. What kind of person are you? A model selection or model averaging person?
(a) I am a model averaging person (2)
(b) I am a model selection person (5)
(c) I am neither (8)
(d) I don’t know (1)
5. Do you support the statement “I am happy with prediction through model averaging, but I
have concerns about model averaging to estimate regression coefﬁcients”?
(a) Model averaging is good for prediction and good for estimating coefﬁcients (2)
(b) Model averaging is good for prediction and bad for estimating coefﬁcients (5)
(c) Model averaging is bad for prediction and good for estimating coefﬁcients (0)
(d) Model averaging is bad for prediction and bad for estimating coefﬁcients (1)
(e) I don’t know (8)




(c) I don’t know (0)
7. Do you agree with the statement that AIC and cross-validation ﬁnd the most predictive
model, whereas BIC ﬁnds the true model (with high probability)?
(a) I agree (4)
(b) I don’t agree (4)
(c) It is a bit more subtle (5)
(d) I don’t know (2)




(c) That depends (11)
(d) I don’t know (1)
9. What is your favorite model geometry, i.e. the space (or distance) in (or with) which you like
to compare models?
(a) Kullback-Leibner divergence (4)
(b) Bayes factor (2)
(c) Coherence (no Dutch Books) (0)
(d) Consistency (0)
(e) Precautionary principle (0)
(f) False positives (1)
(g) False discovery rate (FDR) (2)
(h) Other.. (3)
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(i) It depends, because (2)
(j) I don’t know (2)
10. In model selection it is often proposed or suggested that one should choose the models that
has minimal complexity (e.g. less model parameters), if such models have similar ﬁt or (AIC)
performance as more complex models. Do you agree with this philosophy to minimize
complexity when possible? If you agree how should we deﬁne and compare model complexity
between non-hierarchical models which has similar ﬁt performances?
(a) Yes (4)
(b) No (2)
(c) That depends (8)
(d) I don’t know (1)
11. In one interpretation, model selection tools are aimed at determining a model whose
predictions are aligned with true underlying probabilities. Do objective probabilities have to
exist for model selection to make sense?
(a) Yes, statistical model selection is aimed at uncovering such chances (3)
(b) No, chances are illusory. We merely determine uncertainties pertaining to our beliefs (5)
(c) Well statistics is doing neither of these two things (6)
(d) I don’t know
12. Feel free to write and answer your own questions
Note
1. This quotation, which translates to ‘Plurality must never be posited without neces-
sity’, is most cited as the reason for the association of the ideal of simplicity with
the historical Ockham.
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